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Historic Zoning: The Test for an Uncon-
stitutional Taking
I. The Background of Historic Zoning Legislation
Public and private interest in the preservation of historic buildings in
the United States has been steadily growing for more than 150 years. ' In
1816 the City of Philadelphia prohibited private development in the
Independence Square area.2 New York State established the nation's first
historic house museum in 1850 by acquiring the Hasbrouck house,
Washington's last headquarters in the American Revolution.3 Nine years
later, the Mount Vernon Ladies Association rescued Washington's Vir-
ginia home from possible commercial development .' These and other early
preservation efforts were prompted by a sense of patriotism, a concern that
has been augmented in recent times by such motivations as aesthetic
appreciation, recognition of the economic benefits of preserving our
architectural and cultural past, concern over the increasingly homogeneous
appearance of urban landscapes, and the fear that our cities are losing their
unique identities.
5
The development of a historic preservation "movement" in the
United States has met with considerable difficulty. Although private
preservation is constitutionally, politically and socially less troublesome
than governmental action, its feasibility is limited by practical economics .
6
Thus governmental involvement has become an essential element of any
effective historic preservation scheme,7 taking two distinct forms: direct
intervention through the power of eminent domain, establishing public
ownership of historic buildings; and indirect action through zoning regula-
tions, furthering the preservation of privately owned properties. 8 Although
1. See J. MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW (1965) [hereinafter cited as
MORRISON].
2. Hosmer, Private Philanthropy and Preservation, in HISTORIC PRESERVATION UODAY
151 (National Trust for Historic Preservation and Colonial Williamsburg, Inc. 1966).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban
Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972).
6. Schroder, The Preservation of Historic Areas, 62 Ky. L.J. 940, 941 (1974).
7. Id. at 942.
8. Id. The power of the government to regulate private property has also been
described as arising either from its "enterprise capacity," whereby the government acquires
resources to benefit a governmental enterprise, or its "arbitral capacity," whereby the
government acts to reconcile differences among private interests in society. Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62-63 (1964). See also Comment, La Recherche du Temps
Perdu: Legal Techniques for the Preservation of Historic Property, 55 VA. L. REV. 302 (1969).
the legitimacy of such involvement has not gone unchallenged, both types
of governmental action are now judicially sanctioned.
Exercise of the power of eminent domain for historic preservation
purposes received the approval of the courts at a relatively early date and
has not been the subject of recent litigation. 9 Yet, despite this early
acceptance of direct intervention, practical considerations have limited its
usefulness. Owners of condemned property must be compensated,'° and
funding for the acquisition of historic sites is generally given low budgetary
priority."l Even if funds are available to purchase historic buildings,
appropriators must consider economic burdens beyond the initial acquisi-
tion costs, such as restoration and maintenance expenses and reduction of
tax revenues by removal of the condemned site from the tax rolls.12 If
eminent domain were the sole means of governmental action, only a small
percentage of historically significant buildings could be afforded protec-
tion. Broader impact is provided by the less direct but more economically
feasible measure of zoning regulations.
Historic zoning laws, which preserve significant buildings and areas
by establishing exterior appearance standards, have become the most
common means of preserving historic buildings, yet they have only
gradually gained acceptance in the courts. Two major questions have
arisen: First, is historic zoning a legitimate exercise of the police power?
And second, what test should be applied to determine whether a historic
zoning regulation constitutes an unconstitutionally confiscatory taking of
property? Although the first of these questions has been answered in the
affirmative, the historical development of that judicial stance is instructive.
The second question, the significance of which will become apparent in the
ensuing discussion, remains a source of much confusion. In light of recent
decisions, a clear formulation of such a test will be suggested.
II. Historic Zoning as an Exercise of the Police Power
A. Charleston, South Carolina
The first application' 3 of zoning as a means of historic preservation
occurred in 1931 when Charleston, South Carolina, passed an ordinance
9. In 1896 the Supreme Court unanimously sustained the condemnation of the Civil
War battlefield at Gettysburg for us as a national park. United States v. Gettysburg
Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896). Relying on the patriotic benefits of creating the park,
the Court held that the proposed use of the land was within the scope of the fifth amendment
requirement of a "public use" ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation"). The case of Roe v. Kansas exrel. Smith, 278 U.S. 191(1929), upholding
the condemnation of land for a park commemorating the Oregon and Santa Fe Trails,
eliminated any inference occasioned by the presence of a number of Civil War veterans on the
Gettysburg Electric Court that the rule was confined to Civil War battlefields. Note, The
Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
708, 725-26 (1963).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFr 11 (1974); Wilson and Winkler, The Response of State
Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 329, 330 (1971).
12. See works cited note 11 supra.
13. Although New Orleans, Louisiana, had passed an ordinance in 1924 for the
establishing a historic district and regulating any proposed exterior altera-
tions to buildings within the district. 14 The Charleston ordinance required
that exterior alterations to any buildings erected prior to 1860 conform to
the general pattern of early Charleston architecture and receive the
approval of a Board of Architectural Review created by the ordinance. 15
There are no reported challenges to the Charleston ordinance, apparently
because of widespread support for preserving the atmosphere of the city. 16
Consequently, the issue whether the establishment of historic districts is an
acceptable form of zoning remained open for several years.' 7
B. New Orleans, Louisiana
The first legal challenges to historic zoning appeared in response to
the enactment by New Orleans in 1937 of the Vieux Carr6 Ordinance,
18
which was adopted pursuant to specific authorization of a 1936 amendment
to the state constitution. 9 The ordinance created the Vieux Carr6 Commis-
sion, whose purpose was to oversee the preservation of architecturally and
historically valuable buildings within a defined area of the French Quarter
"for the benefit of the people of the City of New Orleans and the State of
Louisiana. ,20 Challenges to the Vieux Carr6 Ordinance resulted in the first
judicial acceptance of historic district zoning as a legitimate exercise of the
police power, which in turn encouraged the enactment of historic zoning
legislation in other states.
21
The initial challenge to the Vieux Carr6 Ordinance was decided in
1941 in City of New Orleans v. Impastato.22 The Louisiana Supreme Court
upheld the conviction of a property owner who had violated the ordinance
by failing to obtain a permit from the commission before undertaking an
alteration at the rear of his building. The property owner did not attack the
validity of historic district zoning itself, but argued that the New Orleans
ordinance unconstitutionally granted the Vieux Carr6 Commission powers
much broader than those envisioned by the constitutional amendment that
authorized its creation. 23 The court held, however, that the constitutional
preservation of the Old French Quarter, that ordinance was never put into effect, and it was
not until 1937 that New Orleans enacted an enforceable preservation ordinance. MORRISON,
supra note 1, at 17, n. 1l; see notes 18-21 and accompanying text infra.
14. CHARLESTON, S.C., ZONING ORDINANCE art. X, §§ 42-46 (1931).
15. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 133.
16. Note, Land Use Controls in Historic Areas, 44 N.D. LAWYER 379, 391-92 (1969).
17. The regulation of private property of historic value was originally regarded as
purely a matter of aesthetics. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 21. Today a distinction is recognized
between historic preservation ordinances and aesthetic ordinances. Most aesthetic ordi-
nances are concerned with good taste and beauty. Historic preservation zoning is concerned
not with whether the subject of regulation is beautiful or tasteful, but § 15.01, at 15-4 (4th ed.
1975).
18. New Orleans, La., Ordinance 14,538, March 3, 1937.
19. LA. CONST. amend. XIV, § 22A.
20. Id.
21. Wolfe, Conservation of Historical Buildings and Areas-Legal Techniques, 2 ABA
SECTION ON REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS 20-21 (1963).
22. 198 La. 206, 3 So. 2d 559 (1941).
23. Id. at 210, 3 So. 2d at 561.
amendment was intended to give the commission "full and complete
authority with respect to the preservation of the architecture and the historic
value of the buildings situated in the Vieux Carr6 section .... "24
Four months later, in City of New Orleans v. Pergament,25 the
Louisiana Supreme Court ruled on a second challenge to the Vieux Carr6
Ordinance, this time from the owner of a modern structure within the
district who claimed that his building was not subject to the provisions of
the constitutional amendment or the ordinance. 26 The court held that the
purpose of the ordinance was not merely to preserve the old buildings
within the district, but to preserve the antiquity of the entire district, the
"tout ensemble.' 27 To that end, the court said, "Preventing or prohibiting
eyesores in such a locality is within the police power and within the scope
of this municipal ordinance.' '28 Because the ordinance prescribed uniform
requirements for the district, the court found nothing arbitrary or dis-
criminatory in its application to the owner of a building having no
architectural or historical value.29 Preservation of the original Vieux Carr6,
observed the court, benefitted the city not only sentimentally but also
commercially, through the attraction of tourists and conventions to the
city. 30
A third case upholding the validity of the Vieux Carr6 Ordinance was
decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1953. In City of New Orleans
v. Levy 31 the regulations were challenged by a shop owner who had been
24. Id. The property owner argued that since the constitutional amendment limited the
commission's authority to the regulation of exteriors of buildings fronting on public streets
within the district, regulation of an alteration at the rear of a building, not visible from the
street, was not envisioned by the amendment.
25. 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941).
26. Pergament, who owned a gasoline filling station in the Vieux Carr6, was prosecuted
for displaying a large advertising sign without the permission of the commission and in
contravention of the ordinance. Id. at 854, 5 So. 2d at 129-30.
27. Id. at 858, 5 So. 2d at 131.
28. Id.
29. Id. The validity of the "tout ensemble" concept depends upon a reasonable
definition of boundaries for the district in question, since due process problems may arise.
The National Register of Historic Places uses the following general guidelines in defining a
historic district:
A district is a geographically definable area, urban or rural, possessing a significant
concentration, linkage, or continuity of sites, buildings, structures, or objects which
are united by past events or aesthetically by plan or physical development. A district
also may be comprised of individual elements which are separated geographically
but are linked by association or history.
NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES, How To COMPLETE REGISTER FORMS 8 (1975).
Proper determination of a district requires the combined judgment of persons knowledgeable
in history, architecture, real estate marketing, city planning and law. Courts are not likely to
substitute their judgment for that of recognized experts who have carefully considered the
boundaries of a district. Wolfe, supra note 21, at 21.
30. 198 La. at 858, 5 So. 2d at 131. The economic benefit brought to the community by
historic preservation has been frequently cited by courts finding that historic zoning is within
the scope of the police power. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 772,
128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); Town of Deering ex rel. Bittenbender v, Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481, 202
A.2d 232 (1964). Recent decisions, however, indicate that historic zoning need not rely on
economics to be justified. See Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975).
31. 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953).-
prosecuted for displaying excessively large signs and for extending his
building without the Commission's approval. As in Pergament, defendant
argued that the regulation of buildings of no architectural or historical value
was beyond the scope of the constitutional amendment that had authorized
enactment of the ordinance. The court rebutted this contention, reaffirming
its decision in Pergament.32 In addition, petitioner contended that the
amendment and the ordinance were unconstitutional since they were
enacted solely for aesthetic purposes and were thus outside the scope of the
state's police power. 33 Answering this argument, the court said:
Perhaps esthetic considerations alone would not Warrant an
imposition of the several restrictions contained in the Vieux Carr6
Commission Ordinance. But, as pointed out in the Pergament
case, this legislation is in the interest of and beneficial to the
inhabitants of New Orleans generally, the preserving of the Vieux
Carr6 section being not only for its sentimental value but also for
its commercial value, and hence it constitutes a valid exercise of
the police power. Incidentally, both the constitutional amend-
ment and the ordinance recite that the preservation is for the
public welfare.
34
The decisions in Impastato, Pergament, and Levy left no doubt as to
the validity of the Vieux Carr6 ordinance, and established an important
foundation of case law upon which proponents of historic zoning could rely
in arguing that such ordinances were properly within the police power.
C. Nantucket and Beacon Hill, Massachusetts
Judicial approval of historic zoning was extended beyond the borders
of Louisiana in 1955 when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held in two concurrent advisory opinions that the creation of historic
districts in Nantucket and Beacon Hill would be justified under the police
power as acts for the promotion of the public welfare.35 Whether intention-
ally or coincidentally, the stated purposes of the proposed Massachusetts
acts reflected the reliance of the Louisiana Pergament and Levy opinions on
the commercial benefits of historic preservation. 36 The purpose of the
Nantucket act was to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
town
through the preservation and protection of historic buildings,
places and districts of historic interest; through the development
of an appropriate setting for these buildings, places and districts;
and through the benefits resulting to the economy of Nantucket in
developing and maintaining its vacation-travel industry through
the promotion of these historic associations.37
32. Id. at 25-26, 64 So. 2d at 801-02.
33. Id. at 28, 64 So. 2d at 802.
34. Id. at 28-29, 64 So. 2d at 802-03.
35. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955)
(Nantucket); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 783, 128 N.E.2d 563 (1955)
(Beacon Hill).
36. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. at 774, 128 N.E.2d at 559; Opinion
of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. at 784, 128 N.E.2d at 565. But see note 30 supra.
37. 333 Mass. at 774, 128 N.E.2d at 558-59.
Similarly, the purpose of the Beacon Hill act was to promote
the educational, cultural, economic and general welfare of the
public through the preservation of the historic Beacon Hill dis-
trict, and to maintain said district as a landmark in the history of
architecture and as a tangible reminder of old Boston as it existed
in the early days of the commonwealth.
38
Other provisions of the proposed Massachusetts acts were substantially
similar to the New Orleans ordinance, defining the boundaries of districts
and establishing commissions to rule on proposed construction, recon-
struction, alteration, restoration or demolition within each district.39
In holding the proposed acts constitutional, the Massachusetts court
found their purposes properly to lie within the concept of "public wel-
fare," a proper subject for government regulation °40 Although the court
emphasized economic benefits in its discussion of the Nantucket act, it also
noted that the long-standing objection to aesthetic considerations as a basis
for regulating the use of private property was weakening:
4'
There is reason to think that more weight might now be given to
aesthetic considerations than was given to them a half century
ago. In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, at page 33, 75 S. Ct. 98, at
page 102, the court said, "The concept of the public welfare is
broad and inclusive. * * * The values it represents are spiritual as
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-
balanced as well as carefully patrolled.' '42
The Beacon Hill opinion, while incorporating the Nantucket decision by
reference, also emphasized that weight should be given to the legislative
determination that the act's objectives would be attained by the restrictions
it imposed.43
The Massachusetts and Louisiana decisions constituted substantial
precedent for the validity of historic preservation zoning laws. Later
decisions have consistently upheld such legislation as a legitimate exercise
of the police power.
44
38. 333 Mass. at 784, 128 N.E.2d at 565.
39. 333 Mass. at 774, 128 N.E.2d at 559 (Nantucket); 333 Mass. at 784, 128 N.E.2d at
565-66 (Beacon Hill).
40. 333 Mass. at 781, 128 N.E.2d at 561 (Nantucket); 333 Mass. at 787, 128 N.E.2d at
566-67 (Beacon Hill).
41. 333 Mass. at 779,128N.E.2dat561. SeeMoRRISON, supra note 1,at20-46;People v.
Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240
Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis.
262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955) (aesthetic considerations alone may warrant exercise of the police
power).
42. 333 Mass. at 779, 128 N.E.2d at 561.
43. 333 Mass. at 787, 128 N.E.2d at 566-67.
44. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'g, 371 F.
Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974); Rebman v. City of Springfield, 111 I11. App. 2d 430,250 N.E.2d 282
(1969); Town of Deering ex rel Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481, 202 A.2d 232 (1964);
City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964); cf. Mayor of City
of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 271 Md. 265, 316 A.2d 807 (1974); City of Dallas v.
Crownrich, 506 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
III. Historic Zoning As a Taking of Property
The issue whether historic zoning regulations might constitute an
unconstitutional uncompensated confiscation of property was addressed
for the first time in the 1955 advisory opinions of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. 45 According to the court, the proposed Mas-
sachusetts acts could not be construed as unconstitutionally confiscatory on
their face because the acts were analogous to conventional zoning laws, the
constitutionality of which was "thoroughly established. "46 Nevertheless,
as with conventional zoning regulations, unconstitutional applications
might result in some instances because of peculiar hardship and remoteness
from the legitimate purposes of the act.47
Much confusion has surrounded the determination when the enforce-
ment of a historic zoning ordinance crosses the imprecise line between
noncompensable regulation and compensable taking. It has been argued
that tests applied in cases arising under historic district zoning ordinances
should differ from those employed in landmark preservation ordinance
cases, and that charities should be treated differently than non-charitable
property owners. Analysis of cases in which the unconstitutional taking
argument has been considered reveals considerable uncertainty surround-
ing the formulation of appropriate tests for various situations.
A. Landmark Preservation Ordinances and the Taking Issue
The contention that historic zoning regulations constitute the uncon-
stitutional taking of property has most often arisen under landmark
preservation ordinances. Landmark ordinances have been enacted to
preserve buildings of historic importance in jurisdictions where the crea-
tion of historic districts is impractical because of a small number of historic
buildings or their wide dispersal.48 Landmark ordinances, which resemble
historic district ordinances in form,49 typically create a commission com-
posed of recognized experts to designate, subject to a public hearing,
buildings worthy of preservation as landmarks."0 Once landmarks have
45. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955)
(Nantucket); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 783, 128 N.E.2d 563 (1955)
(Beacon Hill).
46. 333 Mass. at 778, 128 N.E.2d at 561. "Many zoning regulations are as severe in their
operation upon landowners as any of the provisions of the proposed act would be likely to
be." Id.
47. 333 Mass. at 781, 128 N.E.2d at 562 (Nantucket); 333 Mass. at 788, 128 N.E.2d at
567 (Beacon Hill). The court suggested in its Nantucket opinion that an example of an
unconstitutional application of the act might be "refusal to permit the removal of some old
and decrepit structure impossible to repair within reasonable cost. 333 Mass. at 781,
128 N.E.2d at 563.
48. See generally Pyke, Architectural Controls and the Individual Landmark, 36 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 398 (1971);,Note, Land Use Controls in Historic Areas, 44 N.D. LAWYER 379
(1969). The determination whether a landmark ordinance is more appropriate than a historic
district ordinance is a matter for the judgment of experts. See note 29 supra.
49. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 8-26A (1976); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A (1971);
PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 14-2008 (1956).
50. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-2.0 (1971).
been designated their exterior alteration or demolition requires a permit
from the commission. 
51
Despite their similarity in form to historic district ordinances, land-
mark ordinances differ markedly in their effect on property owners.
Historic district ordinances place restrictions on an entire community of
property owners, applying equally to all owners within the district, while
landmark ordinances apply only to single buildings in otherwise unaffected
areas. Thus, the creation of a historic district usually increases property
values, assuring each owner that others will not disturb the character of the
neighborhood, whereas landmark ordinances typically lessen the value of
regulated property52 by curtailing landmark owners' freedom to develop
their property to the extent permitted surrounding owners. Despite this
distinction, landmark ordinances, which advance the cause of historic
preservation and thus further the "general welfare of the public," are not to
be confused with impermissible "spot zoning." 53 On the other hand, it is
not surprising that the unconstitutional taking argument has arisen most
frequently with respect to landmark ordinances. Nor is it surprising that the
single landmark ordinance that has generated all of the "unconstitutional
taking" cases affects an area of high economic development in New York
City.
5 4
Noting that many buildings of special historical and aesthetic interest
had been destroyed in recent years "notwithstanding the feasibility of
preserving and continuing . . . [their] use," the City Council of New
York enacted the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law in 1965,
declaring the protection of such buildings a matter of necessity "in the
interest of the health, prosperity, safety and welfare of the people." 5 5 The
51. Id. at § 207-4.0. The New York City law attempts to define the point at which
regulation of the landmark becomes an undue hardship. If the owner shows that his property
is incapable of earning a reasonable return (set at 6% by the law) and the landmarks
commission is unable to devise a satisfactory scheme to remedy that problem, a permit will be
issued. Id. at § 207-8.0.
52. J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT 18 (1974).
53. When a court determines that property has been arbitrarily and unreasonably
designated to receive treatment differing unjustifiably from that accorded surrounding
properties, it will invalidate the designation as "spot zoning." Tracy v. Board of Appeals of
Marblehead, 339 Mass. 205, 158 N.E.2d 317 (1959); Kelly v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 2
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 136, 276 A.2d 569(1971); Appeal of Mulac, 418 Pa. 207, 210 A.2d 275
(1965). On the other hand, "island" or "spot" zoning may be justified if it is germane to an
object within the police power. 8 E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS .§.
25.84 (3d ed. rev. 1965). Since historic preservation is now firmly established as lying within
the scope of the police power, landmark preservation ordinances withstand allegations of
illegal spot zoning. See generally Pyke, Architectural Controls and the Individual Landmark,
36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 398 (1971); Note, Urban Landmarks: Preserving Our Cities'
Aesthetic and Cultural Resources, 39 ALBANY L. REV. 521 (1975).
54. In addition to the cases to be discussed in the text, there are at present only two
reported cases involving landmark preservation ordinances, neither of which involves
allegations of unconstitutional taking: State ex rel. Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey, 28 Ill. App. 2d
252, 171 N.E.2d 246 (1960); City of Ithaca v. County of Tompkins, 77 Misc. 2d 882, 355
N.Y.S.2d 275 (1974).
55. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0(b) (1971).
first challenge to the New York City law came in Manhattan Club v.
Landmarks Preservation Commission,56 in which the owners of a private
club appealed its designation as a landmark. Faced with resignation of
members and unprofitable operation, the club owners had contracted to sell
their building to a developer who planned to raze the structure and
construct an office building on the site. Subsequent to signing the contract,
the owners were notified of a public hearing on the proposed designation of
the building as a landmark. They appealed the formal designation that
followed, but the court refused to review the designation, ruling that it had
no authority to substitute its judgment for that of the commission 57 and
holding that since the owners had not pursued any of the ameliorative
provisions of the statute, the designation could not be considered confiscat-
ory.5 8 Although unnecessary to its decision, the court quoted a conven-
tional zoning decision as setting a standard for determining the constitu-
tionality of the ordinance as applied:
It is not sufficient, in order to render a zoning ordinance confis-
catory and unconstitutional, that permitted uses result in lower
profits, no profits, or actual loss. What must be established is that
the ordinance precludes use of the property 'for any purpose for
which it is reasonably adapted'.
59
Another designation of the Landmarks Preservation Commission was
appealed in Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt,' a case involving
four buildings on an eighty acre site used by a charitable organization as
dormitories for retired seamen. The organization alleged that the buildings
had outlived their usefulness and that it would be remiss to its trust if it
failed to replace the buildings with more modern structures. The lower
court found the designation confiscatory and set it aside,61 relying upon the
distinction between historic district zoning and landmark zoning:
Where a zoning regulation is involved the owner does stand
to benefit from enforcement of a common plan or scheme. Here,
the Commission has suddenly and without warning imposed a
blanket prohibition against alterations or demolitions upon a
single property owner.
62
The court also suggested that historic zoning should not be afforded the
same degree of judicial recognition as other applications of the police
power:
[S]ince the relation to the type of regulation imposed herein to the
public health, safety, and general welfare is less direct than in the
56. 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1966).
57. The court of appeals, specifically overruling the supreme court's interpretation in
Manhattan Club, has subsequently ruled that landmark designations are administrative in
nature and therefore reviewable by New York courts. Lutheran Church in America v. City of
New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 128 n.2, 316 N.E.2d 305, 309 n.2, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 13 n.2 (1974).
58. 51 Misc. 2d at 560, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
59. Id.
60. 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968), rev'g, 53 Misc. 2d 933, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75
(1967).
61. 53 Misc. 2d 933, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1967).
62. Id. at 937, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
case of a zoning regulation, it follows that the burden upon the
property owner, to be legally permissible, should also be less, or
else a taking of property will occur.
63
Because the landmark ordinance prevented the charitable owners from
''utilizing the land to its best advantage," the court felt that a taking had
occurred.64
On appeal, this decision was reversed.65 Implicitly rejecting the lower
court's evaluation of the taking issue, the appellate court proposed its own
test. Noting that the New York City law provides guidelines of "undue
burden" only for commercial property, 66 the court proposed a test for
property devoted to charitable uses: whether maintenance of the landmark
"either physically or financially prevents or seriously interferes with
carrying out the charitable purpose." 67 Because the lower court had not
determined whether preservation of the buildings would seriously interfere
with use of the property, whether the buildings could be converted to a
useful purpose without excessive cost, or whether the cost of maintaining
the buildings without use would be financially burdensome on the organi-
zation, the court remanded the case. 68 These questions were to be reviewed
"in the light of the purposes and resources" of the organization.
69
A third challenge to a New York City landmark designation occurred
in Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York.70 Despite earlier
construction of an additional wing, increased space requirements rendered
the church's midtown Manhattan office building totally inadequate for its
needs. The church sought to have the building's landmark status nullified
so that it could be demolished and replaced with a larger structure. The
court of appeals decided that the Sailors' Snug Harbor test applied and
held the landmark designation, as applied to the church, confiscatory.
7 1
One commentator has suggested that the court of appeals actually
applied a more restrictive test than that of Sailors' Snug Harbor,72 a
conclusion supported by a reading of the dissenting opinion. 73 Although
agreeing with the majority that the Sailors 'Snug Harbor test should apply,
the dissent felt that the findings below did not support application of the
test, and suggested that the case should have been remanded for establish-
ment of necessary facts.74 While the majority had noted that the building
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968).
66. Id. at 378, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316. See note 51 supra.
67. 29 A.D.2d at 378, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
68. Id. at 378, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17.
69. Id. at 378, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
70. 35 N.Y.2d. 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974), aff'g, 42 A.D.2d 547, 345
N.Y.S.2d 24 (1973).
71. Id. at 131-32, 316 N.E.2d at 311-12, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17.
72. Note, Urban Landmarks: Preserving Our Cities 'Aesthetic and Cultural Resources,
39 ALBANY L. REV. 521, 532 (1975).
73. See 35 N.Y.2d at 130-35, 316 N.E.2d at 312-14, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 17-19.
74. Id. at 133, 316 N.E.2d at 313, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
had been used by the church as offices for more than twenty years75 and that
it was located in midtown Manhattan, 76 it seemingly overlooked other
factual considerations. In particular, the dissent observed that the church's
property was not zoned to permit the proposed replacement building, 77 that
no consideration had been given to the transfer of air development rights
from the landmark site to the church's adjacent office annex, 78 and that
there had been no findings regarding the church's claim of undue
hardship.
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The most recent challenge to the New York City Landmarks Preserva-
tion Law as effecting a taking was in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York, 80 a case involving one of New York's most famous
structures, Grand Central Station. The owners of Grand Central had
planned to erect an office tower of more than fifty stories over the terminal,
but the Landmarks Commission denied the required certificate of appro-
priateness. The trial court found the landmarks law unconstitutional as
applied and enjoined the city from prohibiting construction 6f the tower.
81
The appellate court reversed, finding that the owners had not sustained
their burden of proving that the city's action was confiscatory.8 2 In cases
involving non-charitable owners, said the court, the issue is not whether
the owners have been deprived of the property's most profitable use, which
was shown, but rather whether the owners have been deprived of all
beneficial uses of the property. This standard, as the court noted, is that of
conventional zoning cases.83 As will be discussed below, since this test
essentially ignores the issue of profits, there is no reason why it cannot be
applied to charitable owners as well.
B. Historic District Ordinances and the Taking Issue
Only two historic district zoning challenges have turned on the issue
whether enforcement of the ordinance resulted in an unconstitutional
taking of property.84 Of particular significance is Maher v. City of New
75. Id. at 129, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
76. Id. at 131, 316 N.E.2d at 307, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 10. The court remarked that attempts
to designate individual landmarks in high economic development areas are "fraught with
trouble."
77. Id. at 133 n.2, 316 N.E.2d at 313 n.2, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 18 n.2. Given such a zoning
restriction, the dissent observed, the controversy over the landmark designation was
"academic."
78. Id. Transfer of air development rights is a novel concept designed to assist in
historic preservation in highly developed urban areas. See J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT (1974);
Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and The Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85
HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972); Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 372 (1971).
79. Id.
80. 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975).
81. N.Y. Law Journal, Jan. 25, 1975, at 16, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. New York County).
82. 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975).
83. Id. at -, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
84. See Memorandum of Decision, Figarsky v. Historic District Commission of the City
of Norwich, No. 23529 (C.P. Conn., filed March 6, I, 1974); First Presbyterian Church of
York v. City Council of the City of York, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 360 A.2d 257 (1976).
Orleans,85 the first historic zoning case decided in federal courts. 86 In
Maher, a property owner in the French Quarter of New Orleans was denied
permission to demolish a cottage adjacent to his residence. Citing his
intention to replace the cottage with seven rent-producing apartments, 87 he
argued that application of the Vieux Carr6 Ordinance made his property
practically unusable, thereby effecting an unconstitutional taking. 88 The
district court adopted general zoning principles, noting that devaluation of
the rights of those affected by a legitimate exercise of the police power does
not violate the Constitution. 89 According to the court, "[s]uch a law
becomes confiscatory and thus unconstitutional only when it 'goes so far as
to preclude the use of the property for any purpose for which it is
reasonably adapted.' "9 Suggesting several viable uses for the property
that had not been considered by the owner,91 the court found that the owner
had "wholly failed to carry his burden of proving that he ha[d] been
deprived of any reasonable use or return from his property.'"92
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of the taking issue in Maher resembled
that of the district court. 93 Although concluding that the Vieux Carr6
Ordinance was a proper exercise of the police power, 94 the court said that
even a regulatory ordinance that satisfies due process requirements may be
an unconstitutional taking if it is "unduly onerous so as to be confiscat-
85. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'g, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974).
86. See516 F.2d at 1053 n.2.
87. The proposed addition, the owner argued, would contribute more to the character
of the Vieux Carr6 than would preservation of the cottage. The court admitted that such a
finding would be possible but held that the fact that the commission disagreed did not make
denial of the permit arbitrary. 371 F. Supp. at 663.
88. Id. at 662. Petitioner also contended that the regulatory scheme embodied in the
ordinance was outside the scope of the state's police power. This argument, the court said,
was "clearly without merit." Id. at 661.
89. Id. at 662.
90. Id., citing Summers v. City of Glen Cove, 17 N.Y.2d 307, 217 N.E.2d 663, 270
N.Y.S.2d 611 (1966).
91. Id. The court observed:
The evidence indicates that although the plaintiff is now receiving only $40.00 per
month rental from the cottage, paid by the Maher's maid, no effort has been made to
rent the premises out to anyone else for the past eight years. In addition, none except
negligible repairs have been done on the property since 1963. The only alternatives
which the Mahers have ever considered to the present arrangement are 1) demolish-
ing the cottage and building apartments or 2) connecting the cottage to the Maher
home. No evidence has been presented to indicate why this cottage could not be
rented as a single family residence or, with permissible remodeling, as two or more
apartments. It is common knowledge, of which the Curt takes notice, that the
French Quarter is a popular residential area, commanding rents higher than those
prevailing in other parts of the city. Furthermore, no evidence has indicated that it
might be at all difficult to sell this property.
92. Id.
93. 516 F.2d at 1064-66.
94. In sustaining the Vieux Carr6 Ordinance as a legitimate exercise of the police power
the court of appeals relied upon the Supreme Court's view of the expanding range of values
worthy of police power protection. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The
language of the court of appeals makes it clear that historic preservation is a legitimate police
power objective per se, exclusive of any economic benefits it might produce: "Nor need the
values advanced be solely economic or directed at health and safety in their narrowest senses.
The police power inhering in the lawmaker is more generous, comprehending more subtle and
ephemeral societal interests." 516 F.2d at 1060.
ory." 95 Noting that "every regulation is in some sense a prohibition," the
court decided that whether a taking has occurred must be determined in
light of the circumstances of each case. 96 One rule the court found
applicable in all cases, however, is that an ordinance does not operate as a
taking merely because it prevents property from achieving its maximum
economic potential. 97 Rather, the owner must show that application of the
ordinance diminished the value of his property to such an extent as to leave
him with nothing. 98 Since, as the district court had indicated, reasonable
alternatives were available to Maher, the court of appeals found the
challenge to the Vieux Carr6 Ordinance to have been properly dismissed. 99
A more recent case raising the argument that enforcement of a historic
district ordinance resulted in an unconstitutional taking is The First
Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of the City of York."0o In
1959, the church had purchased a building listed with the National
Register of Historic Places from the Historical Society of York County,
Pennsylvania. At the time of purchase, the church had planned to use the
building, which was adjacent to other church property, for expansion
purposes. Pursuant to state enabling legislation,' 0 1 in 1970 the city council
created the "Historic York" district,10 2 encompassing the church and the
building it had purchased from the historical society. In 1972, concluding
that no efficient use could be made of the building, the church applied for a
demolition permit. Upon recommendation of the Board of Historical
Architectural Review, established by the historic district ordinance, the
city council denied the permit, 13 and the church appealed to the court of
common pleas. 104
Although the church raised several issues, the common pleas court
found it necessary to consider only the argument that denial of the
demolition permit amounted to an unconstitutional taking of the church's
property. 05 Holding that the appropriate test for such a claim was that of
95. 516 F.2d at 1065.
96. Id.
97. Id., citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1067. The court of appeals also considered the contention that the ordinance's
requirement of reasonable maintenance and repair of buildings in the French Quarter
amounted to a taking requiring compensation because it imposed an affirmative duty on
property owners to prevent and correct defects. Upholding the provision as necessary to the
accomplishment of the goals of the ordinance, the court nevertheless emphasized that its
decision did not foreclose the possibility that in some cases the expense of maintenance could
be so unreasonable as to constitute a taking. As with other aspects of the ordinance, the
burden of proof would be on the party alleging the taking. Id. at 1066-67.
100. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 360 A.2d 257 (1976).
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 8001-06 (1972). A.2d 257 (1976).
102. York, Pa., Ordinance 31, Sept. 18, 1970.
103. Minutes of City Council Meeting, May 24, 1972, Record at 21a, First Presbyterian
Church of York v. City Council of the City of York, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 360 A.2d
257 (1976).
104. First Presbyterian Church of York v. York City Council, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 150
(1973).
105. Id. at 153.
Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 106 the court remanded the case
for factual determinations by the Board of Historical Architectural Review
upon which the test could be applied. 107 Following a hearing at which
evidence relevant to the Sailors' Snug Harbor test was presented, 108 the
board again recommended denial of the demolition permit, the city council
again adopted the recommendation,' 09 and the church once more appealed
to the common pleas court, which affirmed the decision of the city
council. "10
As noted above, in its original opinion remanding the case, the court
of common pleas had ruled that the Sailors' Snug Harbor test was
appropriate to decide the taking issue. In affirming the city council's
second denial of the permit, however, the court relied instead on the district
court opinion in Maher v. City of New Orleans, noting that Maherhad not
been decided at the time of its first opinion. 111 Although the court observed
that the distinction between landmark ordinances and historic district
ordinances had not been called to its attention at the time of the first
opinion,1"2 it chose to ignore the fact that Maher did not involve a
charitable owner, and, finding the circumstances before it to be substan-
tially the same as those in Maher, ruled that the church had failed to sustain
its burden of establishing that a taking had occurred. 1'3 Since the emphasis
in Maher was on the availability of reasonable alternative uses for the
property, the court properly bypassed the distinction between charitable
and non-charitable owners. The Commonwealth Court implicitly approved
ignoring the distinction by affirming the decision. Because the church
failed to show that reasonable alternatives were unavailable, the court held
that the church had not carried its burden of proving a taking without just
compensation.
IV. Formulating a Test for Takings
Courts have adopted a variety of approaches in ruling on what
constitutes a taking in the historic zoning context, basing their decisions on
whether the ordinance denied property owners of "all reasonable use," a
single reasonable use, or "best use" of their property." 4 This can be
106. Id. at 154. See notes 65-69 and accompanying text supra.
107. Id. at 155.
108. Hearing before Board of Review, Sept. 12, 1974, Record at 35a, First Presbyterian
Church of York v. City Council of the City of York, __ Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 360 A.2d
257 (1976).
109. Resolution No. 160, Session 1974, Record at 104a, First Presbyterian Church of
York v. City Council of the City of York, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 360 A.2d 257 (1976).
The city council found that preservation of the building would not seriously interfere with the
church's use of the property, that the church could convert the building to a useful purpose
without excessive costs, and that the church's maintenance of the building without using it
would not entail serious expenditure in light of the purposes and resources of the church. See
notes 65-69 and accompanying text supra.
110. No. 127 (C.P. York, June 12, 1975).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. The court also observed that the church failed to meet its burden under the
Sailors' Snug Harbor test. Id. See notes 87-92 and accompanying text supra.
114. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'g, 371 F.
attributed to their efforts to differentiate between historic district ordi-
nances and landmark ordinances or between charitable and non-charitable
owners, but there is no sound reason why these considerations should form
the basis for separate tests.
A. Historic District Ordinances v. Landmark Ordinances
Admittedly, landmark ordinances affect property owners differently
than do historic district ordinances. "5 Yet neither logic nor precedent
demands that owners affected by one type of ordinance should be required
to meet a more stringent burden in establishing a taking than those affected
by the other.
The first suggestion that different standards should apply was by the
New York Supreme Court in Trustees of Sailors'Snug Harbor v. Platt. 116
As justification for its proposal that a lesser burden be imposed on owners
affected by landmark ordinances, the court noted that in historic district
zoning cases, owners "stand to benefit from enforcement of a common
plan or scheme," while in the landmark ordinance case at hand "the
[clommission ha[d] suddenly and without warning imposed a blanket
prohibition against alterations or demolitions upon a single property
owner." 117 Although the decision was reversed on appeal, this portion of
its opinion was subsequently quoted by the district court in Maher v. City of
New Orleans1 8 and in the second common pleas opinion in First Presbyte-
rian Church of York v. City Council of the City of York'19 to support the
notion that separate tests should be applied.
Not all courts faced with landmark ordinance cases would agree,
however. In two significant decisions, a uniform standard for landmark
and district ordinances has been espoused. In Manhattan Club v. Land-
.marks Preservation Commission20 the court said in dicta that the landmark
owners' burden would be to show "that the ordinance precludes use of the
property 'for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted,' "21 and in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York' the court held that
the crux of the taking issue was whether "plaintiffs demonstrated that the
regulation in issue deprives them of all reasonable beneficial use of their
property. "123 Significantly, the same test was applied by both the district
court and the court of appeals in Maher v. City of New Orleans,'24 a
Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974) (deprival of all reasonable use of property); Lutheran Church in
America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974)
(deprival of a single reasonable use); Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2d
933, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1967) (deprival of best use).
115. See notes 52-55 and accompanying text supra.
116. 53 Misc. 2d 933, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (.1967).
117. Id. at 937, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
118. 371 F. Supp. 653, 662 (E.D. La. 1974).
119. No. 127 (C.P. York, June 12, 1975).
120. 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1966).
121. Id. at 560, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 852; see notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
122. 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975).
123. Id. at -, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 28; see notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
124. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'g, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974).
historic zoning case. Since historic preservation zoning is recognized as a
proper exercise of the police power, courts should not equivocate on the
matter when considering a challenge to a landmark designation. If the
property owner has not been deprived of all reasonable uses of his property,
and the preservation commission has complied with all requirements of the
ordinance, the designation should be sustained. Unless such a test is
utilized, the effectiveness of landmark preservation ordinances across the
nation will depend upon the perceptions of individual judges as to what sort
of burden is too great for a property owner to bear.
B. Charitable v. Non-Charitable Owner
A special test for charitable property owners was formulated by the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court in Trustees of Sailors'
Snug Harbor v. Platt. 2 5 The test was needed because the case arose under
the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, which contains provi-
sions for alleviating a statutorily defined level of unacceptable hardship for
commercial owners but contains no comparable provisions or definition of
unacceptable hardship for charitable owners. 126 The court enunciated its
test as follows:
The criterion for commercial property is where the continuance
of the landmark prevents the owner from obtaining an adequate
return. A comparable test for a charity would be where mainte-
nance of the landmark either physically or financially prevents or
seriously interferes with carrying out the charitable purpose. In
this instance the answer would depend on the proper resolution of
subsidiary questions, namely, whether the preservation of these
buildings would seriously interfere with the use of the property,
whether the buildings are capable of conversion to a useful
purpose without excessive cost, or whether the cost of maintain-
ing them without use would entail serious expenditure-all in the
light of the purposes and resources of the petitioner. 1
27
Some confusion as to the meaning of the Sailors' Snug Harbor test
was occasioned by the New York Court of Appeals decision in Lutheran
Church in America v. City of New York. 128 Although the court purported
to apply the Sailors' Snug Harbor test, it did so in the absence of factual
determinations that the test seems to require. 129 As a result, the court found
that denial of a single reasonable use of the property constituted a taking. 130
It is suggested that the court erred in deciding the Lutheran Church
case without reference to all relevant facts, and that its decision should not
stand as precedent for a narrow judicial focus. Furthermore, close scrutiny
reveals that the Sailors' Snug Harbor test is, in effect, the same legal test
125. 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968); see notes 65-69 and accompanying text
supra.
126. 29 A.D.2d at 377, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
127. Id.
128. 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
129. See notes 72-77 and accompanying text supra.
130. 35 N.Y.2d at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 359, N.Y.S.2d at 17.
applied in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York' 3 ' and in
Maher v. City of New Orleans,132 both involving non-charitable owners,
the only difference lying in the factual findings necessary to apply the
test-findings which will vary with each owner, whether charitable or
non-charitable. The decision of the Commonwealth Court in First Pres-
byterian Church of York v. City Council of the City of York133 supports this
conclusion, as the court found the Maher test to be controlling.
C. Test
Regardless whether a historic zoning case involves a historic district
ordinance or a landmark ordinance and a charitable owner or a non-
charitable owner, a single test should be applied if an unconstitutional
taking is alleged: Does the ordinance, as applied, deprive the owner of all
reasonable beneficial uses of his property? Adoption of this test in all
cases, it is suggested, will end the uncertainty that currently surrounds the
taking issue in the field of historic preservation law.
V. Conclusion
Historic preservation zoning is a growing phenomenon in the United
States. The number of historic district and landmark ordinances has
increased dramatically in the past twenty years. This growth has obviously
tracked the evolving judicial acceptance of historic preservation as a
legitimate objective of the police power. As the use of historic zoning
expands it can be anticipated that more frequent challenges to the applica-
tion of historic zoning ordinances will arise. Adoption of a consistent
standard for measuring these challenges will eliminate needless confusion
in this inherently complicated area of the law.
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131. 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975).
132. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'g, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974).
133. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. - 360 A.2d 257 (1976).
